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MR. KEYTE:

I want to thank everybody for

attending Fordham’s first virtual conference.
First, I want to wish everybody’s families
and colleagues the best of health and safety.

These

are, of course, very difficult times for everybody,
but we’ll get through them. Again, I hope everybody is
safe and well.
In the meantime, going virtual in the
business world and the antitrust field has been for
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some a challenge; for others, just interesting; for
me, of course, as a Luddite, a bit of a nightmare, a
little bit of which I have already experienced today.
With this conference and going forward, we
at the Fordham Competition Law Institute are going to
create a platform for ourselves to have a virtual
family, do some additional conferences during the
course of the year, leading up to the annual live
conference, which we will certainly do every September
or October.
Today is our traditional Workshop Day.

We

have two economic panels coming up, one put on by
Edgeworth Economics, the other put on by The Brattle
Group.

We hope everybody participates in those.

There may be some time for Q&A at the end of those, so
be ready to look for those.
In between those two workshops we are going
to have a Heads of Authority Q&A session. Typically,
in the live Workshop Day, the heads of authorities
have their own meeting, a private meeting, that goes

3

on. What we are doing this year, being a little
creative, is having seven key heads of authority from
Europe and the United States do a question-and-answer
session with me addressing tech tools, sustainability,
and antitrust in the time of pandemic. It should be
quite interesting, and we will certainly want
questions from the audience.
We will also have instant surveys that we
will do leading up to some of the panels.

We hope

everybody participates in those too.
Thank you very much.

Morning Session I
Conflicting Decisions in Pharmaceutical
Class Certification Workshop
Moderator:
George Korenko, PhD
Partner, Edgeworth Economics
Panelists:
Jeffrey C. Bank
Partner, Wilson Sonsini
Justin Bernick
Partner, Hogan Lovells
Danielle R. Foley
Partner, Venable LLP
Tram Nguyen, PhD
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Principal Consultant, Edgeworth Economics
* * *
DR. KORENKO:
attending the panel.

Good morning. Thank you for
I’m George Korenko. I am a

Partner at Edgeworth Economics, an antitrust
economist, and I regularly testify in matters
involving antitrust, commercial damages, and other
areas.

I have done a lot of work in the

pharmaceutical industry throughout my career, so this
is going to be a very interesting panel for me.
We’ve got a great panel discussion for you
today.

We have four distinguished panelists.

Our

topic is the conflicting decisions we have seen in
recent years in pharmaceutical class certification
cases.
When we talk about some of these cases —
whether it’s Nexium, Solodyn, Lidoderm, Asacol,
Intuniv, now with Lamictal and Niaspan — it may be
difficult to interpret where we are in this landscape
of cases in terms of what it takes to certify a class
in a pharmaceutical class action case.

Fortunately
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for us today, our panelists are going to provide some
insights into where we stand with respect to some of
the critical issues that seem to be in conflict in
these cases.
Our first panelist is Danielle Foley.

She

is going to discuss the issue of what constitutes a de
minimis number of uninjured members of a proposed
class.

Danielle is a Partner at Venable LLP.

She is

a trial lawyer with extensive experience in complex
class actions and multiparty litigation involving
antitrust, false advertising, breach of contract,
business tort, and unfair competition claims.
Danielle has defended clients against both the Federal
Trade Commission and private plaintiffs.

She has

defended pharmaceutical companies as a trial counsel
in three reverse-payment jury trials held under the
United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in FTC
v. Actavis as well as numerous others.
Our second panelist will be Jeff Bank, who
will discuss how courts have come down on the use of
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averages in pharmaceutical class certification
matters.

Jeff is a Partner at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich

& Rosati where he practices antitrust litigation and
counseling particularly in the pharmaceutical
industry.

Jeff is an experienced litigator

representing both plaintiffs and defendants.

His work

has ranged from complex multidistrict litigations and
global cartel cases to actions against competitors.
He has successfully defended pharmaceutical,
technology, and media companies against class actions
and has experience in all aspects of litigation from
discovery through appeal.

He regularly counsels

clients on merger clearance issues and business
practices.

He has represented a diverse range of

clients before the FTC, including companies from
medical device, pharmaceutical, and media sectors.
Jeff was recently named a Rising Star for 2020 by
Law360.
Third, my colleague at Edgeworth Economics
Tram Nguyen will provide an economic perspective on
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predominance issues in some of these recent decisions.
Tram is a Principal Economist at Edgeworth Economics.
Since joining Edgeworth, Tram has worked on a range of
antitrust, labor and employment, and public policy
issues.

She has particularly experience applying

economic research and analysis in numerous antitrust
matters within the pharmaceutical industry.

She has

coauthored papers on economic topics and legal
developments in the U.S. pharmaceutical antitrust
cases.

She specializes in quantitative economic

analysis and modeling within the context of industrial
organization and antitrust, labor and employment, and
firm management, and she has extensive experience with
analyzing large and varied datasets as well as
expertise in machine learning and statistical tools.
Finally, last but not least, Justin Bernick
will close out our panel with a discussion of
causality issues in pharmaceutical class
certification.

Justin is a Partner at Hogan-Lovells.

Justin defends clients in antitrust lawsuits in state
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and federal courts and has participated in some of the
nation’s largest antitrust class actions.

He has

experience in multidistrict and multijurisdictional
litigation and consumer class actions.

He has

represented companies in the Department of Justice,
Federal Trade Commission, and state antitrust
inquiries, including merger and conduct
investigations.

Justin litigates a wide range of

antitrust and competition issues pertaining to mergers
and acquisitions, allegations of price fixing, market
allocation, vertical and horizontal agreements, and
monopolization.

His work spans various industries,

including life sciences and pharmaceuticals. Recently,
Justin was named a Rising Star Under 40 by Law360 and
was also named in the Legal 500 U.S.
That is our distinguished panel.
With that, I will get us started with
Danielle.
MS. FOLEY:

Thank you, George, and thank you

all for joining us today.
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I am Danielle Foley from Venable.

As George

mentioned, I try a lot of antitrust cases.
Fortunately, I have tried a number of them in a number
of years, which can be hard on the schedule but great
for the experience.
One thing I have learned is that the
technology always fails just when you think you need
it to work, so we’re just going to roll with it.
Thank you, George, for recovering my slides and
helping us out today.
I am going to talk about the concept of de
minimis in the antitrust pharmaceutical class action
space.

This is an issue that has been hotly contested

in cases for a number of years.

It really asks a

central question — that is, whether the number of
uninjured class members is too many for the class to
be certified.

To understand this question you really

have to think about two major questions: (1) why does
it matter that there are uninjured class members?; and
(2) whether there are just too many uninjured class
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members.
The question of “Why does it matter?” really
stems from two things: (1) the nature of the class
certification tool in the requirements of the Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 23; and (2) the nature of the
pharmaceutical’s distribution and payment chain, which
creates unique situations and unique questions for the
antitrust pharmaceutical space.
If you think about the nature of the class
certification tool, class certification, as we all
know, is the exception in our system to the rule that
litigation should be conducted by and on behalf of the
individual named parties.

That is why Rule 23 sets

out a number of requirements in order for a case to
proceed as a class action.
As the First Circuit said in In re Asacol
Antitrust Litigation,1 “The proper treatment of
uninjured class members strikes at the heart of the
competing considerations for Rule 23 certification,”
and really the question is under Rule 23 whether there
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are too many uninjured class members can affect all of
the elements of Rule 23.
In particular, they can affect predominance,
which is the question: “Are there too many uninjured
class members or common issues” — in particular, you
see this with antitrust injury — “to predominate?”
You also see it with respect to
ascertainability: Are there too many uninjured class
members to be able to identify them and separate them
from the injured class members in a reasonable and
administratively feasible manner?

And then manageability, which is really the
question: Are there too many uninjured class members
to allow the plaintiffs to present all of their
evidence and all of their elements in a way that
protects the defendant’s Seventh Amendment and due
process rights?
If you think about the antitrust and the

1

907 F.3d 4251 (1st Cir. 2018).
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pharmaceutical distribution cases, when you think
about the pharmaceutical chain, you have to think
about these cases are not the simple case where there
is one defendant selling one product at one price
directly to consumers.

Instead, in all of these cases

you have a brand company with brand products, you may
have one generic or you may have multiple generic
companies all selling different generic products, you
have insurance companies, you have pharmacy benefit
managers, you have wholesalers, you have retail stores
and retail pharmacies of varying sizes, you have
health and welfare benefit plans, and you have
consumers, and they are involved in a web of different
contractual arrangements.
What that means is not everyone in the
potential classes are affected in the same way and not
everyone is injured.

How does this play out in these

antitrust cases in the pharmaceutical space is that
you will have different categories of uninjured class
members.
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We see this play out largely in the endpayor classes.

That’s not to say these issues do not

arise in the direct purchaser classes, but you see
them predominantly in cases involving end-payors,
which are the third-party payors and consumers.
For example, what you see in cases alleging
the delay of entry of generic products are arguments
about brand-loyal consumers, and those are consumers
who, even if a generic had been available earlier,
would not have switched, they would not have paid a
lower price, and thus they are not injured.

You will

similarly see it with respect to consumers who pay a
flat co-payment for their insurance — if they have the
same co-payment for the brand as they would have had
for the generic, they have no overcharge, and thus no
injury.

You see these types of issues arise in these

cases.
Now the question is: How many is too many?
That is really the question of de minimis. Where did
this concept of de minimis come from?

It first arose
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in the First Circuit’s decision in In re Nexium
Antitrust Litigation2, which was a reverse payment
case.
The timing of the class certification
decision is a little unique and odd because the First
Circuit issued its opinion after the jury trial was
completed.

I represented one of the generic

companies.

After a six-week jury trial, there was a

full defense victory.

The defendants asked the First

Circuit to withdraw the appeal, but the First Circuit
wanted to weigh in on this issue, and so the First
Circuit proceeded with the Nexium decision.

What the

First Circuit said had a couple of key lessons and
takeaways.
First, it is okay for a class to be
certified with some number of uninjured class members
as long as it’s a de minimis number. Now, the First
Circuit did not define what de minimis was; instead,
the First Circuit said, “It will be a functional
test.”

2

Really, what the First Circuit said was: “Is

177 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015).
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the number of uninjured so large that it renders a
class impractical of improper? — that could be more
than de minimis.” “Is the number of uninjured so large
that it causes non-common issues to predominate? —
that wouldn’t be de minimis.”

“Is the number of

uninjured so large that it violates the defendant’s
Seventh Amendment or due process rights? — then it
might not be de minimis.”

But it gave no hard-and-

fast rules and it left it clear as mud in that sense.
The other takeaway is that parties would
need to come forward with evidence to support the
calculation of the number of uninjured class members.
The court concluded that it had not been shown that
there was more than a de minimis number of uninjured
class members.

Really, if you drill down on the

decision, what you see is that there wasn’t enough
evidence to take the number of prescriptions of Nexium
— for example, the number of prescriptions that might
have stayed on the brand product — to the number of
class members, and that was a critical issue that the
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First Circuit had.

You see in the cases that followed

Nexium real battles between the experts and the
parties about trying to take the number of
prescriptions and turn it into the number of uninjured
consumers.
What happened after Nexium?

Not

surprisingly, there are conflicting results and
scrutiny of the economic evidence. For example, there
were some decisions, including one that came out right
after Nexium, just a few months later, the Vista
Healthplan v. Cephalin, Inc. (Modafinil) case, where
the court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
said: If it is more than 5 percent — that’s what the
evidence was, more than 5 percent uninjured — then
that was not de minimis; that created problems across
the range of requirements for Rule 23 that affected
either the ability for the class be ascertainable, for
the plaintiffs to prove predominance and some
manageability — so the class was denied.
On the other end of the spectrum, we saw
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some courts grant certification where there was a
range of uninjured class members from 5 percent up to
10 percent.

In In re Lidoderm, for example, even

where the plaintiff’s expert conceded 6–7 percent of
the class members were uninjured, the class was
certified.
In re Solodyn is one at the high end of the
spectrum.

There was a District of Massachusetts

decision following Nexium that really leaned heavily
on the Nexium decision.

There the court certified the

class even though the plaintiff’s expert conceded that
possibly 10 percent of the class was uninjured, and
even under some scenarios put forward by the
plaintiff’s economist that 19—37 percent of the class
was uninjured.

But, with the guidance of Nexium, the

court certified the class.
The takeaway from all of these cases was a
real battle between the experts at class certification
about how many class members were uninjured and how do
you identify them.
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That takes us to where we are now.

Really,

you see that there continue to be challenges to
certifying classes in the antitrust pharmaceutical
space, and particularly challenges with in the
consumer class.
In 2018 the First Circuit went back into the
fray, as I like to say, of this class certification
issue in the Asacol decision.

There the First Circuit

walked back the reach of Nexium and did look at the
unique facts and circumstances of that case.

In

Asacol the court denied class certification where at
least 10 percent of the class was uninjured and the
court recognized this was likely thousands of
uninjured class members.

As we will hear from some of

our other panel members later on, this created real
issues.

Asacol recognized with predominance an

antitrust injury, which has become a real focus point
in a number of other cases that followed.
As one court has described the Asacol
decision, “It is likely the death knell of
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pharmaceutical antitrust class actions brought by
indirect purchasers.”
Following Asacol, we have seen again
increased scrutiny and real difficulty certifying
classes, in particular, that contained consumers.

So,

shortly after the Asacol decision, the District of New
Jersey denied class certification where there were 10
percent uninjured class members, right in line with
Asacol, and frankly calling into question the earlier
decision of Solodyn, which had followed the Nexium
decision.
You see other cases, particularly in the
First Circuit, where there have been a number of these
cases percolating, where class certification was
denied, and in particular for consumers.

For example,

in the In re Loestrin case, the court denied
certification to a consumer class with 6.7 percent
uninjured class members but granted certification to
the third-party payers; so you saw a split of the
traditional end-payor class there.
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In re Intuniv was denied class
certification.
In Asacol on remand, interestingly, class
certification was denied.

Even where the plaintiffs

had offered to jettison the consumers and just focus
on the institutional payers, the court denied class
certification.
So there are cases where on the margins,
when you are down in the 5 or 6 percent range,

you

may still find some courts certifying classes with
that number of uninjured class members, but it is
harder.

Courts are continuing to grapple with how

many uninjured class members are too many and what
level of scrutiny they need to bring to the economic
evidence.

In order to have your class certified you

need a strong economic analysis that is backed up by a
strong testifying expert, frankly.

There is still no

bright line by the courts to say, “This number is the
magic number,” but we see if it is greater than 5
percent there is trouble; if you are at 10 percent,
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you are very much in trouble of getting your class
certified.
I think one of the takeaways that we have
seen and we will continue to see will be fewer
consumer classes will likely be pursued and certified,
with a likely larger focus on the institutional
members, such as third-party payers, because of the
real problems that you see with consumer classes and
the problems present in these cases.
I will pass it back to you, George.
DR. KORENKO:

Thank you, Danielle.

I have one question for you.

You mentioned

there is no bright line in terms of when you have too
many or when you don’t have enough to cross that
threshold of de minimis.

But when the economists of

the plaintiffs and defense disagree and they are on
opposite sides of those 10 and 5 percent, how do you
see the court resolving those issues?
MS. FOLEY:

You see the court really delving

in and conducting the rigorous analysis that is
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required and has been required since Hydrogen
Peroxide.

There are often competing Daubert motions

filed against the experts and the courts consider
those at class certification.

The courts look for

concessions by the testifying experts and look for
places that they can put a real hold on it and say,
“Okay, this is the bottom number; this is the lowest
number the plaintiffs will concede exists,” or “this
is the highest number that they will concede exists.”
It is truly a battle of the experts at that point and
the court making a factual determination.
DR. KORENKO:

Thank you for your discussion.

I think it’s really interesting.
With that, we will move on to Jeff Bank to
discuss the use of averages.
MR. BANK:

Great.

Hi, everyone.

Thanks, George.

It’s nice to see you here.

wish we were in person, but thanks to James and
Fordham for organizing this.
Standard disclaimer: My views expressed

I
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today do not necessarily reflect those of my firm,
colleagues, or clients.
I am going to talk today about the use of
averages and recent case law on the subject.

Some of

my colleagues here today will likely address some of
the same cases that I am going to speak about but I
think will be coming at it from different angles.
Before we get to when are averages used in
class certification analysis, I want to take a step
back and see how we got where we are.
There have been a number of Supreme Court
cases over the last decade and numerous appellate
courts have also taken up the question of how a court
should evaluate class certification motions.
At the Supreme Court level, the Dukes case,
the Comcast case, and the Tyson Foods case laid out
some standards and some guidance for the lower courts
in terms of evaluating class certification motions
that I think are particularly important when it comes
to the question of whether the use of averages is
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appropriate in class certification analysis.
The Supreme Court has said that the lower
courts must conduct a “rigorous” analysis; that
analysis may overlap with the merits in some
circumstances; the court should act as a gatekeeper
regarding expert opinions offered in support or
against certification; the expert analysis has to
actually fit the theory of liability.

The Court has

held and endorsed the use of some statistical evidence
as a means of showing common proof among class members
— and we are going to really dig into that in terms of
the use of averages.
The Supreme Court has stressed, though, that
whether and when statistical evidence can be used to
establish class-wide liability really depends on the
purpose for which the evidence is being introduced and
the elements of the underlying cause of action.

It

becomes very fact-specific very quickly.
Based on some of those Supreme Court
rulings, the Third Circuit has described the district
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court’s responsibility as the following: “The district
court is supposed to determine that the requirements
of Rule 23 are met with any factual determinations
made by a preponderance of the evidence.

The district

court is to resolve all factual and legal disputes
relevant to class certification, even if they overlap
with the merits, and the district court is to consider
all relevant evidence and arguments including expert
testimony offered by the moving and opposing parties.”
So how does that get us to averages?

Well,

Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the plaintiffs show
predominance in order to certify a damages class.
Specifically, they need to show that questions of law
or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members.
Whether a class might contain dozens of
members or thousands or more members, the plaintiff’s
expert will need to develop a methodology that can be
used to show that the class members were harmed, and
that they were harmed in a sufficiently similar way,
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by the conduct alleged to be unlawful.

Assuming all

of that can be shown via common proof, the expert will
also need to show that damages can be calculated
through a methodology that does not require
individualized inquiries.
Experts have a number of possible methods to
use to show that plaintiffs can meet their burden.
One method is to show that an overcharge can be
determined by looking at average real-world prices
compared to average but-for prices.
The question for us today is: When is the
use of averages sufficient to meet the standards of
Rule 23?

We are going to look at some of the cases in

the last couple years that have really focused on
this.
In re Niaspan (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2019) is a
really interesting case out of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.

It is one of the reverse payment cases.

There were motions for certification by both the
direct purchasers and the end-payors and,
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interestingly enough, the court found one way for the
directs and one way for the end-payors.
For the directs, the court found that there
were very few uninjured customers, so the direct
purchasers’ expert’s use of averages to show injury
and harm across the direct purchaser plaintiffs was
accepted by the court.

The court looked into whether

there were significant differences between the direct
purchasers and did not find sufficient differences to
justify denial of certification.

The court also found

that the defendants’ insistence that the court focus
on actual prices was flawed because the experience of
customers in the real world was not necessarily equal
to their experience in the but-for world.

It was a

fairly straightforward decision.
However, on the end-payor side the court
found that the expert’s use of averages in the common
impact analysis simply did not suffice.

The court

held that the use of averages generally is
controversial and found that courts have “come down on
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both sides of the issue at the class certification
stage.”
The district court mused that the use of
averages may be somewhat suspect, but not necessarily
fatally flawed, and highlighted a theme of what I
think will run throughout all of the cases that I will
discuss, that the courts really need to conduct a
rigorous analysis: they need to look at the specific
drug product at issue; they need to look at the
particular class that is being proposed for
certification; and they need to look at real-world
market factors that relate to that class and that
particular drug.

In doing so the court really needs

to focus on differentiation among the data between
particular plaintiffs in the proposed class and
whether there are indicia that the averages being
proposed by the experts are concealing or not
concealing certain outliers within the proposed class.
For the end-payor class in Niaspam the court
eventually concluded that the use of averages simply
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does not show whether an individual class member was
injured; that it masked uninjured proposed class
members, going to the problems that Danielle just
spoke about; and that it masked large variations in
class members’ purchase prices.

Now, of course, there

may be some variation in purchase prices that is
acceptable in a common impact analysis, but where the
variation is so large as to cause individualized
inquiry to be necessary, then it may be that the class
is unsuitable for certification.
In this case, the end-payor plaintiffs
(EPPs) also really provided no means to identify
uninjured class members — such as brand loyalists,
coupon users, and flat co-payers — and we will see how
that is different in another case in a little bit.
Some of the other panelists will talk about
the In re Lamictal Antitrust Litigation case (3d Cir.,
Apr. 22, 2020), so I am going to just focus on a few
high-level observations here.
The Third Circuit overturned the district
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court’s certification of the class in this reverse
payment case.

I think the decision can fairly be read

to mean that the courts really need to undergo and
conduct a rigorous analysis when looking at the Rule
23 standards and it is not enough to just do so on a
superficial level.
Here the lack of rigorous analysis strongly
colored the Third Circuit’s holding, maybe even more
significantly than the Third Circuit’s criticism of
the use of averages.

The Third Circuit emphasized the

rule that factual matters must be determined at the
class certification stage if they are necessary to
determine whether certification should be granted.
Here the parties had put forth evidence
regarding complex pricing strategies and machinations
between the brand and the generic — they were very
complex — and the Third Circuit essentially chided the
district court on not conducting enough analysis on
the impact of those pricing strategies.
The court also reiterated language that
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every plaintiff must be able to show antitrust injury,
kind of bleeding into the analysis that Danielle
talked about, about what percentage of uninjured
plaintiff members may be too much.

The district court

said, “Every plaintiff must be able to show antitrust
injury through evidence that is common to the class,”
and it cited to an earlier case, Hydrogen Peroxide:
damages may not be susceptible of measurement across
the entire class.

The Third Circuit really dug in

here on the difference between showing injury versus
showing damages, and I think that does get conflated
in some of the district court opinions that we are
discussing today.
On the substance of averages, the Third
Circuit found that there was a very high presence of
potentially uninjured customers, and that really sank
the plaintiff’s expert’s use of averages here.

Up to

a third of the proposed class paid no more or less for
the generic drug than they would have absent the
defendant’s supposedly unlawful agreement.

So 33
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percent potentially uninjured class members was too
much here.
There are three other decisions that I want
to talk about today.
The decision in In re Loestrin 24 Fe
Antitrust Litigation

in the District of Rhode Island

came down in July 2019.

There it was a mixed theory

by the plaintiffs as to the allegedly unlawful
conduct.

They alleged that the brand had obtained its

patent through sham; they alleged that the brand had
conducted a practice known as product hopping, where
it allegedly unlawfully transferred the market from
one product to another to avoid generic entry; and the
plaintiffs alleged a reverse payment between the brand
and the generic to delay generic entry.
The court acknowledged that the complicated
facts and legal theories really make it challenging to
figure out the but-for world.

For example, what if

one of the theories from the plaintiffs was eventually
proven true but the other two were not; how should an
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expert figure out what the but-for world would look
like in that context?
If the plaintiffs were able to show that all
three types of conduct were actually unlawful, what
would the but-for world look like in that context?
Would each proposed class member be harmed in a
similar way as a result of all the different methods
of alleged unlawful conduct, or were some class
members harmed by one type of conduct but not another?
The court acknowledged those questions,
acknowledged that they were complex and difficult, and
the court focused on the direct purchaser’s expert’s
use of averages, particularly in the purported context
of damages.

The court noted that the methodology put

forth by the expert incorporates the variation across
class members in the actual prices they paid and in
the prices they would have paid, and the court said
that providing averages correctly summarizes the
combined effects of all of these class members in a
single class-wide overcharge measure.

The court said
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that aggregating damages in this way is well accepted.
The defendants focused on trying to show
differences between the proposed class members: those
purchasers who had been purchasing the brand product
but would still continue to purchase the brand
product; those purchasers who had been purchasing the
brand product but in the but-for world would have
switched to the generic product; and those purchasers
who only purchased generic products and alleged harm.
At the end of the day, the court said that the model
works for them all.
I think one of the keys here, though, is
going back to the point that this case really involved
multipronged alleged unlawful conduct.

The court

noted that “defendants had not earned the benefit of
the doubt when the very reason we cannot know the
answer to that question is because of their alleged
wrongdoing” and cited to the Namenda case.

So the

court essentially put the burden back on the
defendants to overcome the fact that the alleged
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conduct was so complex.
In re Restasis Antitrust Litigation
(E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2020) is similar.

There it was an

end-payor class that sought certification.

It was

another complicated case with an alleged multiprong
scheme to delay generic entry.
The expert used a “yardstick” approach,
comparing what the but-for world would have been had
generics entered earlier for Restasis.

The expert

looked to another similar drug product to see what
happened there in the real world and then used
averages to calculate damages.
Notably, the expert in Restasis did identify
and exclude proposed class members that were flat copayers — government entities and fully insured through
their health plans — so the expert took steps to
identify and exclude potentially uninjured class
members from the analysis, which I think makes a
difference.

To Danielle’s earlier point, the experts

are really going to have to dig in and do a much more
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in-depth analysis to identify those uninjured class
members and try to exclude them early on in the
analysis.
Similar to the Loestrin case, the court
pointed to the complexity of defendant’s alleged
wrongdoing as the cause of any uncertainty in the
class certification analysis.

The court said, “If the

plaintiffs cannot prove their damages with precision,
the most elementary conceptions of justice and public
policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk
of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created.”
Interesting that at the class certification
stage the court is essentially holding the defendant
out as the wrongdoer and placing the uncertainty on
them there, before really any finding on the merits,
and even in the class certification proceedings the
court did not make any finding on the merits that the
defendant was in fact a wrongdoer and yet held them to
a heightened standard.
In In re Zetia Antitrust Litigation (E.D.
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Va. June 18, 2020) there was a direct purchaser class
in the Eastern District of Virginia.
the Lamictal decision.

Zetia came after

The defendant cited Lamictal

and said, “The plaintiff’s use of averages in Zetia
was improper and that the court did not conduct enough
of a rigorous analysis on the plaintiff’s expert.”
The court did acknowledge that under
Lamictal the use of averages may be inappropriate in
some circumstances, however the court distinguished
Lamictal noting the unique contracting strategy
involving a nuance in the particular anti-epilepsy
drug market that was at issue in Lamictal, and the
court acknowledged that the defendant’s real-world
pricing strategies may impact whether averages can be
used; you have to look at the market factors.

But

ultimately, the Zetia court found that the defendants
failed to put forward evidence that the Zetia drug was
marketed in the same way Lamictal was.
So the burden does shift to the defendants
to come forward and show that real-world market
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factors, nuances about the particular drug, unique
circumstances about payers and purchasers in a
particular drug market, differences between channels
(whether through wholesale, retail, institutional) —
that those really make a difference and foreclose the
use of averages.
So where does that leave us today?

It is

pretty clear that the courts all acknowledge that they
have to conduct a rigorous analysis, that the merits
may come into play and may really matter at the class
certification stage.

It also has emphasized the

battle of the experts that will occur at class
certification even before the battle of the experts at
the merits stage, becomes a precursor to that, and in
some ways may limit the analyses and arguments that
can be put forth at the merits stage depending on what
the parties put forward at class certification and
depending on the court’s holdings at the class
certification stage.
Sophisticated econometric analyses are
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absolutely necessary in class certification,
particularly in end-payor cases where you have
distribution chains in the pharmaceutical industry
that are incredibly complex.

To try to show that

common proof can be used to prove impact and damages
for those end-payors at the bottom of the chain really
requires significant and substantial analysis, and
Daubert motions are going to become even more common
at the class certification stage than they already
were.
It is also important to keep an eye on the
non-pharma cases.

Of course there was the Tyson Foods

case that I talked about earlier; the Aluminum
Warehousing (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020) case in the
Southern District of New York; the earlier cases on
rail freight and hydrogen peroxide.

I think the use

of averages is going to become a hot topic in numerous
industries and looking outside pharma is going to be
important.
I do think, though, that pharma is unique in

40

many ways.

There have been rapid and significant

changes in the industry over the last ten to fifteen
years — consolidation horizontally and vertically;
growing power of pharmacy benefit managers to
influence pricing and supply at multiple rungs in the
chain; the difference between a generic product, a
brand product, a specialty product is blurring more
and more so competition between pure brands and
generics looks different now than it did ten or
fifteen years ago in some circumstances; complex
insurance agreements that may require individualized
inquiry; growing use of rebates and discounts to
compete for particular customers or channels.
All of these complexities weigh against the
use of averages because it really becomes a question
of whether it is possible to show that any
pharmaceutical purchaser at any level is truly
“average.”
George, back to you.
DR. KORENKO:

Thank you, Jeff.

Very
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interesting.
I do have one question.

You talked a lot

about the merits issues coming up more and more at the
class certification stage.

In my experience, a lot of

times the courts are reluctant to address at least
some of the merits issues.

Do you see this changing

as we go forward given some of the recent cases we
have seen?
MR. BANK:

I do.

I think, especially with

the Lamictal decision, the courts are really under
fire to dig into the facts, figure out the particular
nuances relating to a specific drug, figure out what
the competition in the marketplace was, figure out
what it would have been in the but-for world.

So I do

think the merits are going to become more and more
important, which has important implications for the
litigation overall.
I know in the past in some cases we have
tried to bifurcate class certification discovery
versus merits discovery.

I think it is going to
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become even more difficult to bifurcate that.

It

means that you may not be able to do class
certification proceedings as early in the case as
plaintiffs or defendants might want and class
certification may have to wait until the end of fact
discovery.
Third-party discovery is, of course,
critical in pharmaceutical antitrust cases, and
beginning that process of sending out subpoenas to
those third parties as early as possible is going to
be critical.
I think the merits findings at the class
certification stage will also accelerate the
litigation.

There will be fewer novel issues to

address at the summary judgment stage, and you may
start seeing settlements and resolutions come earlier
in litigation than they would have otherwise.
DR. KORENKO:

Thank you, Jeff.

Very

interesting.
Next we will turn to Tram to talk about the
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economics of predominance.
DR. NGUYEN:

Thank you, George.

To continue the discussion I am going to
cover the economic analysis of predominance and, in
particular, I will talk about some of the direct
purchaser cases and end-purchaser cases from the angle
of antitrust injury and damages, and then I will
review some recent court decisions on the issue of
damages and on the issue of uninjured customers.
First, let’s talk about the economics of
class certification. From the perspective of
economics, when we talk about the requirements of
class certification, it usually hinges on two
fundamental questions.
The first question is: Can plaintiffs show
with common evidence common injury to the entire
class?

This means can all or nearly all class members

be shown to have suffered antitrust injury from the
conduct — for example, can the plaintiff show with one
regression model that all class members have suffered
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an overcharge?
Once the first question is established, then
the second question becomes: Can plaintiffs also rely
on the formulaic approach to calculating damages?
In economics we define a customer to have
suffered injury when the actual price that he or she
paid is higher than the but-for price absent the
conduct, and damages is then the difference between
the two prices.
For an individual inquiry regarding the use
of averages, let’s review a specific direct purchaser
case.

In general, a lot of cases that we see today

have a common formula where the plaintiff’s experts
would rely on average prices to show common proof of
injury to the class.

What the plaintiff’s experts

usually do is to calculate one average but-for price
for all class members and also, in a similar fashion,
what is the average actual price for all class
members.

If the average but-for price is below the

average actual price, then the class is considered to
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have suffered injury.
In some of these cases, the defendant’s
experts might point out that for some class members
the actual price that they pay might be below the
average but-for price and therefore they are uninjured
by the conduct.

But if the number is small, as

Danielle explained before, the courts have concluded
that a small absolute number of uninjured class
members might be picked off in a manageable manner and
that would not hinder class certification.
In the case of Lamictal, as Jeff explained
the background of the case before, this is a case
where the court actually went in the opposite
direction.

In April of this year, the court of

appeals vacated and remanded the class certification
decision by the district court.
Lamictal is an interesting case where the
facts of the case made the use of averages become
inappropriate and we can take a closer look at why
that is the case. In this case the brand manufacturer
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GSK, instead of competing with the generic on
introducing an authorized generic product, competed on
price.

That means GSK then had negotiations with

purchasers or had strategic pricing, and that in turn
caused Teva, the generic manufacturer, to also lower
its price preemptively.

The defendant’s expert

actually showed that twenty-five out of thirty-three
generic-only purchasers likely paid less in the actual
world than absent the conduct.

This leads to the

situation where we have a large percentage of the
class being uninjured or likely uninjured by the
conduct and there is a need for individualized inquiry
to look at individual circumstances and study whether
an individual class member was actually injured or
not.
To demonstrate how this works we can look at
a simple example where there are only four wholesalers
in the class and each one has an actual price that
they pay per pill and the but-for price.

The actual

price here is the blue bar and the but-for price is
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the orange bar.
If we follow the plaintiff’s theory of
injury, the plaintiff’s expert would compute the
average actual price (the blue line) and the average
but-for price (the orange line).

As long as the blue

line is above the orange line, then there is injury to
the entire class, and this is true in this example.
However, if we look at the individual data,
Wholesaler 2 and Wholesaler 4 did not suffer any
injury because the actual price is below their but-for
price, and they make up 50 percent of the class.

This

is an example where averages actually mask individual
differences in prices and there is a need for
individualized inquiry into the question of injury.
Next I will cover the issue of identifying
uninjured class members.

As Danielle has mentioned,

it is common to have uninjured class members in a
class.

But when does it become an issue to class

certification?
In the case of Asacol, as we have heard
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today, the plaintiff proposed a similar mechanism to
Nexium where in this proposal the claims administrator
could rely on an unrebutted affidavit from putative
class members to identify who was injured or uninjured
by the conduct.

But the First Circuit in the case of

Asacol actually held that if these affidavits could be
rebutted, then the approach is no longer appropriate.
But in the case of Asacol there is a generic
delay and also a product hop, which means the brand
manufacturer in the case switched the product from one
formulation to another and forced consumers into a
hard switch before the generic became available.

The

goal is to retain market share for the branded product
before the generic entry.
Both sides in this case, the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s experts, estimated approximately 10
percent of the class would be uninjured by this
conduct.

Because of the nature of the case, we might

have brand stayers; we might have consumers who
purchased the old formulation and have stopped
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purchasing the new formulation altogether before the
generic was available; or there could be consumers who
are insensitive to price because they have the same
co-pay for brand and generic products, so they would
also not be injured by the conduct.
The problem becomes how we identify these
members in the class from the data.

In the case of

Asacol, identifying these uninjured class members
became an infeasible task.

The plaintiffs proposed no

other mechanism besides following Nexium to identify
and remove uninjured members from the class.

And,

because this is an end-payor case, 10 percent
of an end-payor class is not “a small absolute number”
that can be removed before trial, so the court did not
certify the class.
But what is interesting with Asacol is also
there is another wrinkle on top of the issue with
uninjured class members.

The plaintiffs in the case

also proposed an approach where the plaintiff’s
expert, Dr. Conti, proposed a class-wide proof of
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injury by estimating that the generic drug would take
up 90 percent of market share when it became available
and they could use this probability to prove that all
or nearly all class members were injured.

But the

court concluded that in this case if we use the 90
percent market share to show that an individual
consumer would likely purchase the generic, and
therefore be injured, it would lead to the wrong
conclusion that everyone was injured by the conduct.
We can dissect what this means, but first I
want to point out that the district court’s opinion on
90 percent of market share means that 90 percent of
the class being injured is also misleading because we
are talking about a market of a product, which doesn’t
really mean an individual only consumes one product or
one pill in the market.
But even if we assume that 90 percent of the
market will convert to the generic, that can be used
as an approximation to the probability that a person
will purchase the generic, it still does not mean that
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this is going to be proof to show that the entire
class is injured because if we look at a simple
example with paying consumers in the market, we know
that nine out of ten will purchase the generic and the
other one will purchase the brand, for simplicity.
But if we look at a given consumer, we do
not know whether in the but-for world that given
consumer will still purchase the brand or the generic,
and therefore is uninjured or injured by the conduct.
If we go ahead and assume that everyone is likely to
consume a generic and that therefore they are injured,
we will arrive at the wrong conclusion that ten out of
ten consumers here will purchase the generic.

But the

data show that in fact there is one person who is
uninjured, so probability methodology is not a
deterministic approach for class-wide proof of injury.
Now if we combine both the problem of the
use of averages and uninjured customers in an endpayor case, we arrive at In re Niaspan Antitrust
Litigation (MDL No. 2460, 2020).
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The use of averages, in the view of the
Niaspan court, is that it is a common approach and can
be acceptable as long as differentiation in the data
being used to compute the average prices is not so
large that the average becomes misleading or, in the
facts of the case, allow that the averages do not
conceal the true story behind the data.

Niaspan is

again a generic-delay case where there is an endconsumer class including the third-party payors and
end-consumers who purchased Niaspan or the generic
version of Niaspan.
In this case, the plaintiff’s expert relied
on an average overcharge model that relied on several
assumptions, the literature on generic market
substitution rate and price discount, and the
plaintiff’s expert also used the rise in quantity from
the Niaspan product and the yardstick product to
calculate a yardstick model.

There are several issues

with this approach.
First of all, the yardstick model is not a
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model to show class-wide injury and there is large
variation in the data regarding restriction costs to
third-party payers and consumers.

Specifically, from

the data, third-party payers might pay anywhere
between zero to $100 for the prescription, and
similarly consumers can also pay between zero to $250,
so immediately the average will mask all of these
large variations in the data.
But the issue also lies with the assumptions
that the model is based upon.

If we use the

literature to approximate the generic substitution
rate, the literature is based on a variety of drugs
that might not be specific to the drug at issue or
might not have the same characteristics as the drug at
issue.

We can think, for example, of a lifesaving

drug, a psychoactive drug, might have very different
characteristics, and therefore consumers might be less
likely to switch to the generic, so the generic
substitution rate is not the same as what the
literature says.
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Similarly, the yardstick products also might
not have the same characteristics as the product at
issue.

But, most importantly, the plaintiff’s

expert’s model in this case is an average overcharge
model, and that is what it means — it computes an
average overcharge.

At best, it can calculate the

overcharge across all class members on average but
does not really prove whether an individual class
member, PPT or consumer, actually suffered an injury.
So the court in the case of Niaspan
concluded that the use of averages in the yardstick
model is not a proof of class-wide injury; it masks
uninjured class members; and also large variations in
the data.

Also, as Jeff mentioned, the end-payor

plaintiffs in this case also provided no means to
identify uninjured class members.

They could be brand

loyalists who will continue to purchase the brand even
when the generic was available; or consumers who use a
coupon in their purchase and therefore do not pay a
higher price; or flat co-payors who have the same co-
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pay for the brand and the generic.

This became an

important issue in this case even when the EPPs
proposed to use third-party data to identify the
uninjured class members.
We can think of the issue with flat copayors.

Even if we have third-party transactional

data to identify a flat co-payor in the data, we would
have to observe the same consumer who purchased both
brand and generic at different points in time and
under the same insurance management structure.

But,

in reality, we might only observe the consumers who
purchase only the brand or only the generic; or, even
if they made a purchase of both, they might have
switched from one insurer to another insurer over this
period of time; or their insurance plan structure
might have changed and therefore their co-pay
structure changed.

So it became quite impossible to

identify the uninjured class members from the class
even if the plaintiff proposed to exclude flat copayers from the class definition.
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In conclusion, the issue of common proof of
injury becomes an important factor, continues to be an
important factor, in class certification decisions
where, in particular, an average overcharge model,
which is often relied on by plaintiff’s experts, is
not a common proof of injury, especially when we see
that there are large variations in prices in the data
and the use of averages cannot mask individualized
inquiry.
Also, plaintiff’s and defendant’s experts,
even if they focus on assessing subgroups in the class
that might be uninjured, the issue of identifying who
these uninjured customers are becomes important.

If

it is complicated to identify and remove uninjured
class members from the class, this might become a
problem for class certification.
Last but not least, probably the approach is
not a deterministic approach and cannot be used as
common evidence for class-wide injury.
Thank you, George.
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DR. KORENKO:

Thank you, Tram.

Very

interesting.
I want to pick up on one thing that you
mentioned.

You talked about probability is not

deterministic and how the 90 percent probability of
switching to a generic does not tell you that
necessarily 90 percent of the class is injured. Can
you explain a little more why a probability does not
tell you the same thing as the fact of injury?
DR. NGUYEN:

The answer is twofold.

First of all, if you look at a market as a
whole, we are looking at transactions or the number of
products being sold in a market, not the number of
consumers in a market because the same patient might
refill their prescription a few times or buy multiple
products at once.

So the 90 percent market rate does

not translate to 90 percent of the class purchasing
the generic or the brand.
On top of that, this is the average
probability for the entire market, but each individual
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will have a different probability of purchasing the
brand or the generic depending on their insurance plan
or their personal preferences or their doctor’s
preferences for the drug.

So we cannot just apply the

same rule of thumb, 90 percent probability, to
everyone in the class.

We have to look at their

individual circumstance to determine whether in their
but-for world, given all of their individual factors,
will they purchase the brand or the generic.
DR. KORENKO:

Great.

Thank you, Tram.

I

appreciate that.
With that, we will turn it over to Justin.
MR. BERNICK:

Thanks, George.

Thanks,

everybody, for listening and for having us here to
speak with you today.
I am going to take a little bit of a step
back here.

We talked a lot about lack of injury,

uninjured consumers, using averages, proportions of
uninjured consumers.

I am going to look at little bit

at the question of “Why?” — underlying those
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determinations that there may be uninjured consumers
in the class, what is the underlying causal reason for
that lack of injury or the injury itself?
Just speaking for myself as an impatient
trial lawyer, I like to ask, “Well, what is the core
issue in dispute here?”

Often, these pay-for-delay

cases hinge on some underlying factual predicate.

To

what extent can a court grapple with that at the class
certification stage, or should the experts just assume
that the actual predicate is true and defer that
calculus to later on down the road for a merits
decision at summary judgment or trial?

There are some

cases that go in different directions on that.
I think the first predicate to keep in mind
is that it is pretty well established under Rule 23
that it requires an evidentiary showing, meaning facts
or some sort of common proof.

We talked a lot about

the economic models that plaintiffs put forward to
attempt to satisfy that burden of common proof of harm
or impact to the class members.
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We have talked a lot about how that economic
model, that common proof that the class might put
forward, could mask individuals who are not injured to
the point where common questions no longer predominate
under Rule 23 and a class should no longer be
certified.
But again, there is this closely related
question here about the factual or causal predicate to
the alleged injury — what actually causes this
proportion of injured class members that could defeat
class certification at the end of the day?

What if

plaintiffs’ common evidence or their economic model is
based on an underlying factual or causal predicate
that is just disputed or even demonstrably false?
There are lots of these factual predicates
underlying a pay-for-delay case. It could be the
underlying validity of the patent; it could be FDA
approval issues; it could be at-risk entry by a
generic that has occurred even apart from any
agreement that is being challenged in the case; and it
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could deal with other issues related to a but-for
entry date — all sorts of underlying factual
predicates that are assumptions that are built into
the economic models that we talked about earlier in
the day.
So what if some of those predicates are just
not true or disputed?

Is a court required to grapple

with those at class certification? There are some
conflicting cases in this area, and we’ve talked about
some of them already, but I am going to talk about
them in a little bit different way than just what the
economic model might predict.
Lamictal is one of the cases that has come
up repeatedly today.
purchaser.

There, of course, it’s a direct

The part that I’m going to talk about is

the drug purchaser case challenging GSK’s agreement
with Teva not to launch an authorized generic.
The district court certified the class.
Third Circuit reversed with some really strong
language about how the judge should have resolved

The
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factual disputes.

If you are a defense attorney

primarily, you are going to see a lot in here that you
will like — we will talk in a bit about the language
in other cases that if you are on the plaintiff’s side
you might like — but there is a lot of strong
language, including the language on this slide, about
how the judge really should have grappled with some of
those factual disputes, and language that is stronger
than you see in a lot of class certification opinions.
The question is: “Why?”
Here I think it is important to understand
the predicate for the Third Circuit’s finding that the
model masked averages and masked uninjured consumers.
One of those predicates is that the Third Circuit
noted that the defendants argue that GSK competed with
Teva, even though it did not have an authorized
generic, through this unique contracting strategy of
offering targeted discounts to pharmacies on the
branded product, the branded Lamictal; and that that
strategy, in turn, led Teva to reduce the price of its
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generic even though there was no authorized generic
(AG) on the market.

In some ways, this is a frontal

assault to the legal theory in the case, that the NoAG provision actually reduced competition. Here you
had a contrary theory being offered by the defendants
that there was robust price competition even with the
alleged reverse-payment agreement.
You could imagine some court saying, “Well,
that’s a merits issue.
road.

Let’s kick the can down the

We’ll deal with that at summary judgment.

The

plaintiffs are entitled to assume for purposes of
their economic model that there was causality, there
was impact, despite this contracting strategy.

That

is something for a jury or a fact finder to resolve
later on in the case.”
But the Third Circuit said, “No.”

The

defendant tried to argue, successfully here, that this
contracting strategy led to lower prices for certain
purchasers than they would have paid even if GSK had
launched an authorized generic.

The court said that
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the district court should have grappled with that
underlying factual dispute about whether Teva lowered
its price in response to this contracting strategy,
and whether absent the settlement agreement GSK would
have pursued the strategy.
In other words, the Third Circuit was
saying, “You need to resolve this battle of the
experts.

You need to resolve this underlying factual

predicate about causality at the class certification
stage; it’s not something you can punt on and just
make an assumption about later on in the case.”
Again, there are the other issues that are
premised on that about averages and lack of injury to
a certain proportion of consumers, but there is this
underlying causal question that the Third Circuit said
the district court should have resolved.
And there are cases going the other way.
Again, these are cases that we’ve talked about before
too.
In re Solodyn Antitrust Litigation (2017 WL
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4621777, C.D. Mass. 2017) was a direct purchaser case
challenging reverse payment from Medicis to Impax.
Here the issue was at-risk generic entry: you had
various generics that were entering at risk, and the
defendants argued that the plaintiffs could not
satisfy the prominence inquiry under Rule 23 because,
in part, generic Solodyn was available through at-risk
entry during the class period; so even though you had
exclusion of a potential generic competitor, you’ve
had generic competition present in the market; and, if
there was, then how could you have an actual impact to
class members?
This sounds in some ways similar to the
Lamictal story: If you have this underlying factual or
causal predicate that is missing for the alleged harm,
or some reason why the harm would not be suffered by
the class members, then shouldn’t the court consider
that at the class certification stage?
Here in Solodyn the court

reached the exact

opposite conclusion with some language that is helpful
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to plaintiffs in these cases, finding essentially that
the question of whether the agreement reduced
competition in light of at-risk injury was a question
for the jury; it is not a question for the court that
applies certification — let’s push that back and
decide it later — but the plaintiffs are entitled to
rely on this assumption of causality and that the atrisk entry would not have impacted the class members
and prevented the injury that they suffered.
In re Glumetza Antitrust Litigation (2020 WL
4732333 (N.D. Cal. 2020) was a similar story, a direct
purchaser case challenging a no-authorized-generic
agreement.

The defendants argued that Lupin would not

have entered because it expected to lose the patent
suit.

Again, this is a core factual predicate: if

there would have been no entry, there would have been
no harm to any of the class members.
The court there, sort of like with Solodyn
said, said that the plaintiff’s expert was of course
permitted to assume the “causal link” for purposes of
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the model of impact and assume that Lupin would have
entered and that the alleged price hikes would not
have occurred.

Again, the court said, in language

that will be helpful to plaintiffs, that these
questions would be decided at summary judgment or at
trial and can be answered with common evidence.
I think the common thread that I see in
these cases — because I think there is a common
thread, even though on their face they seem to be
anomalous with one another — I think the court in
Glumetza put its finger on one of the important
distinctions here, and that is whether or not those
causal questions, those questions related to impact,
are capable of yielding common answers to the class.
If those causal questions could result in
individualized inquiry and break down into mini-trials
for each of the individual consumers, then those are
causal questions that I think under Lamictal courts
are obligated to address at the class certification
stage.

You can’t just punt on those questions if the
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answers to those causal questions do not reveal common
answers.
But I think in Glumetza the court was saying
that when you have this underlying factual predicate
that is common to the class, or potentially common to
the class, and yields common answers, that is not one
that the court should be wading into.
There are some specific quotes in Glumetza
that go to this issue.

“Defendants raised the patent

merits to change the but-for scenario and jump ahead
to the impact analysis,” and the court said that
wasn’t appropriate.
The court also said: “The class doesn’t just
break down if the defendants are right.

Instead, the

entire class loses.”
Another way the court put it is: The harms
don’t become individualized; instead “the harms will
simply fall away entirely.”
In other words, if the defendants are right
that there would not have been injury, then nobody was
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injured, and that is susceptible to common proof and
something that the court can address later on after
the class is certified.
I think that’s where I would leave things in
terms of the overall conclusion here.

The plaintiffs

and defendants both tried to inject merits-related
issues or questions that they perceived to favor them
in the class certification inquiry for the court to
resolve, and where we see those getting traction, if
at all, is where those underlying causal questions or
impact or injury questions are not susceptible to
common proof.
Maybe another way to frame it — although
this is sort of a semantic distinction — is in my mind
the causation question is about whether the alleged
conduct caused the anticompetitive harm — for example,
whether the reverse payment settlement caused delayed
generic entry.
The impact question is a slightly different
question: Whether a particular class member was
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injured by the anticompetitive harm.

Courts might

grapple with those underlying causation or merits
question, that it’s necessary in order to determine
whether common proof can show impact to each of the
individual consumers.
If the answer is yes, that that question
related to causation or impact could lead to
individualized inquiry, then that is something that
courts should, and sometimes do, as in Lamictal, to
resolve at the class certification stage.
I’m intentionally trying to be brief in
order to have a little bit of time for questions at
the end, so back to you, George.
DR. KORENKO:
interesting.

Thank you, Justin.

Very

I appreciate the discussion.

One question I have for you is: when you are
talking about the causation issues, I am wondering —
obviously, this is a slightly different tack — when we
look at the Comcast case, where the damages analysis
had to line up with the theory of the case, how does
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that dovetail with the causation issues you are
discussing?
MR. BERNICK:
well actually.

I think it dovetails pretty

Comcast has taken on sort of a

mythical life of its own in the class certification
arena where people try to make Comcast arguments in
every case and they will spin Comcast in different
ways.
At its core what I think Comcast is about is
that the plaintiff’s expert’s model must be rejected
as common evidence of impact if it cannot distinguish
the impact of the unlawful conduct from other factors.
In that case, as folks probably know, there were four
theories of impact and injury.

Only one of those

actually survived by the time the case got to the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court said that because the
model just calculated aggregate damages from all four
theories but could not isolate the effect or impact of
the one theory that survived, then the model had to

72

fail; the model was no longer causally linked to the
theory that had survived in the case.

Another way of

putting it might be that the expert model did not fit
the legal theory that was still on the table and could
not isolate those particular damages.
In my personal experience, Comcast is often
invoked but somewhat rarely successful in isolation in
defeating class certification.

I think that is

probably true largely because plaintiffs and experts
are careful to try to ensure at least some alignment
between the legal theory or the causal theory that is
being alleged and the economic model particularly in
light of Comcast.
The actual situation at issue in Comcast,
where you have a damages model that contemplates harm
from theories that are no longer being alleged or
things that are not unlawful, is somewhat rare, but
again it is invoked pretty often.
There are some exceptions where Comcast does
get some traction. Skelaxin would be a good example,
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where the district court denied certification for endpayors for a variety of reasons, including
ascertainability.

But the court also there noted

problems under Comcast, that the plaintiffs’ model
included transactions with entities that the
plaintiffs later argued should be excluded from the
class.

So there was a disconnect between what the

model was actually modeling and what the plaintiffs
were alleging in terms of harm, and that is the type
of situation where Comcast can get some traction.
In contrast, you have cases like Modafinil
where the Third Circuit reversed the denial of
certification.

It was over objections by the

defendants that the plaintiffs’ model inappropriately
masked individual issues, like Comcast did, and just
calculated aggregate damages from five separate
reverse-payment agreements rather than looking at them
individually.

The court said: No, that Comcast issue

is not really sufficient to deny certification here,
and distinguished Comcast on the grounds that the
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plaintiffs’ theory was premised on the aggregated
injury from those five different agreements.
So there are cases that go in different
directions, but in a vacuum, George, I do not see
Comcast as often the sole reason why certification is
denied in these cases.

It is often invoked but,

again, because everyone is sort of hyper-focused on
this issue of alignment between the legal theory and
causal theory and the model of impact.

I have not

seen it be successful in a vacuum by itself with a lot
of regularity.
DR. KORENKO:

Thank you, Justin.

With that, I’m happy to turn to questions.
While we wait for some questions to come in, I am
curious if any of our panelists have questions for
each other in terms of these presentations.

There has

been an overlap clearly in terms of these discussions,
but there are a lot of issues that are nuanced, as
you all distinguished the Lamictal case from some
others because of the unique contracting strategies
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and new fact patterns.
I think fundamentally that gets down to some
of the merits-based issues that Jeff and Justin talked
to, and then, ultimately, those issues affect the de
minimis issue because once you have that fact pattern
and you have identified these uninjured class members,
how many are there; and, to Tram’s point, how do you
figure out who they are even if you know how many?
MS. FOLEY:
just as an economist.

I can ask a question for Tram
What do you think are the most

difficult issues to answer as an economist?

What are

the most interesting ones to look at from your
perspective in the class certification arena?
For me, each of the questions under Rule 23
really do have an economic aspect to them.

I would be

curious from an economic perspective which ones you
think are the most interesting or the most difficult
to answer.
DR. NGUYEN:

I think the most interesting

issue to look at usually from my experience is how do
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we determine the but-for scenario for each individual
consumer, whether they are a TPP or an end-payor,
because the data in these types of cases does not
really include everything and we have to tease
information from the documents, from the line
structure, and the data and transactional data
together.

We do not observe net prices, for example,

that a TTP paid or an end-consumer paid, so in order
to figure out that whole story and piece them together
I think is one of the most exciting and interesting
exercises that we have done.
I think it is also a valuable lesson for
both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts to think
about rather than just immediately jump to looking
only at the average price because that doesn’t really
tell even a small part of the whole story.
MR. BERNICK:

I have one comment/question

that anyone can chime in on.

One thing lurking in the

background here is if you are on the defense side and
you identify that there is a bunch of uninjured
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consumers, very often you find yourself in the box of
saying, “Well, now that I’ve identified them, the
court can draw a circle around them and exclude them
from the class.”
There is a tension between digging into the
model and identifying who is not injured and walking
into a situation where they can be easily carved out
and excluded and have a more cohesive class.

So there

is this tightrope of “Well, there are uninjured
consumers, but we have no idea who they are.

We can

tell the court that it is 10 percent of the class, but
we really do not know who that 10 percent is.”
I am curious about others’ experiences and
how they navigate that issue.

I know that’s always a

tightrope that you run into.
MS. FOLEY:

I’ll be happy to take that one

because that is one of the issues you often face in
these cases.

Conceptually, you can say, “Look, there

are uninjured” — I think, as the court in the
Modafinil case said it — “but I cannot tell you
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exactly who they are because every single one of these
consumers has the possibility of being the brand
loyalist, the flat co-payer, and you have to look at
the coupon usage.

I can tell you from looking at the

group of data I have that there is at least 10 percent
or so that are uninjured, but I cannot tell you ‘It’s
Joe, it’s Sally, it’s Mary’ — I cannot tell you who
they are.”
Trying to get the court to understand that
issue is definitely a struggle because you do not want
to fall into that trap of “Oh, I have identified the
people right here; just carve them out; it is easy,”
because it is really just not that hard to do.

I

think that is a real problem.
MR. BANK: I think it also highlights the
difference between direct purchasers and end-payors.
With the direct purchaser classes, especially in
pharma antitrust, they are usually limited to a few
dozen at most, and identifying uninjured direct
purchasers or power purchasers may be a lot easier at
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that level.

But once you start getting down to the

end-payors, consumers, insurers, or even indirect
reseller plaintiffs, the ability to identify the
particular uninjured customers gets harder and harder.
I expect that to play out over the next few
years in the cases where, again, it is another hurdle
to certification for the end-payors that maybe the
direct purchasers figure out.

Maybe their experts are

better equipped to come up with the analysis that
excludes the uninjured plaintiffs in the first
instance whereas the end-payors have a bit harder of a
time to do so.
DR. NGUYEN:
end-payor cases.

I agree on the issue with the

I think even in the situation where

we know, let’s say, 90 or 95 percent of the consumers
would switch from the brand to the generic, it is
impossible to know who they are.
Or, in particular, if we have a case where
the generic was not even in the market during the
class period, then even if we know this is the
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literature or the approximate market share of the
generic, we cannot know in that situation who would
have switched because there is actually no data to
show that.
DR. KORENKO:

We do have a question from one

of our attendees: “It seems like the impact could be
common even when there are individual differences in
pricing.

Are there case precedents for finding common

impact based on an analysis of average even though
class members pay a variety of different prices that
are not susceptible to common analysis?

If so, what

kinds of models or fact patterns did you see in those
cases?”
MR. BANK:

I’ll start this off.

I think it

is certainly possible that if the plaintiffs can show
impact through common proof, that they can certify the
class even where there are individualized differences
in pricing.
We see that with direct purchaser classes
all the time in pharmaceutical antitrust cases.

You
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have the three big wholesalers and their pricing is
certainly different than the medium-sized or small
wholesalers out there, and yet direct purchaser
classes are certified regularly.

So I do think that

the experts can come up with models to show common
impact and deal with differences in individualized
pricing.
Now, when there might be certain nuances as
to a particular product or a market that causes wide
variation in those differences in pricing, then
defendants may have an argument to raise as to why the
class in that particular circumstance should not be
certified.
MR. BERNICK:

I agree with that.

Taking one step back — and no particular
case comes to mind that illustrates this principle
because it runs throughout the cases — I think it is
really important to keep in mind the distinction
between the fact of injury and the amount of injury.
Typically, in the class certification stage the courts
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are concerned with the fact of injury — can you
demonstrate that all or substantially all class
members have been harmed or not, and is there a
proportion of the class members who have not been
harmed?

That is what we have been talking about

today.
Typically, the fact that there is variation
in the amount of injury, the fact that people paid
different prices and might have been harmed by
individual amounts, that alone often is not sufficient
to the class certification, those individualized
damages issues.
At the class certification stage, it is
really about: “Can you demonstrate impact on all or
substantially all class members and is there some
model for calculating aggregate damages?

If there are

individualized damages issues, we will kick those down
the road to deal with at a later day.”
I don’t know if that addresses the question,
but that is how we typically see the cases now.
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MR. BANK: That’s exactly what the court in
Lamictal said.

It said: “While every plaintiff must

be able to show antitrust injury through evidence that
is common to the class, damages need not be
susceptible of measurement across the entire class for
purposes at least of Rule 23(b)(3); so you can deal
with some of those individualized inquiries as to
damages later on.”
MS. FOLEY:

On same point, what you see in

the cases too is the plaintiffs have their model and
then you have the defense side come in and test it
with the individual class members’ data.
on the margins.

It is really

Can you show that using, for example,

the named direct purchasers’ data that a number of
them are not actually paying that average wholesale
price; some of them are actually paying much lower?
Then you are going to get some traction.
But it is hard because there are not that
many named class members often in these cases and you
can see the opportunity for the plaintiffs to test
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their data in advance before they bring a case. It is
often a number of the same firms bringing the cases
over and over again.
DR. KORENKO:

Danielle, your point actually

dovetails very well into a second question that we
received.

When Tram was discussing the uninjured

customers in the Lamictal case — I think you know that
twenty-three of the direct purchasers were found by
the defendant’s expert to have potentially paid less,
or at least no more, than the but-for price.

How do

you efficiently deal with those individual inquiries?
In other words, how do you identify those folks either
before you go into litigation and test your own models
as a plaintiff’s expert or as a defense expert to
actually dig in and figure out who those folks are?
MS. FOLEY:

As a defense lawyer, I am

excited to see those examples.

I don’t think that is

any surprise.
Obviously, we rely on the economists to help
us figure that out.

A lot of it really depends on the
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model that the plaintiff’s experts try to put up and
giving us a target to shoot at.
Obviously, the devil is in the details — as
I think Jeff was saying — the market, the product, the
purchasers, and what uniquely was going on in each
individual case.

But, obviously, we have a problem

like you see in Lamictal — you are going to have a
problem getting your class certified.
DR. NGUYEN:

In the case of Lamictal, I

think it is also important as a defendant’s expert to
look at the situation regarding negotiations between
the manufacturers and the pharmacies in the case
because there are multiple individual negotiations
going on.

Immediately we should be careful about

relying on just one average price, but instead look at
in the but-for world absent the price competition what
would happen to individuals’ but-for prices across
these pharmacies.

I think those are the question that

will have to be dealt with on both sides.
MR. BERNICK:

Lurking in the background of
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the efficiency question is the concept, particularly
for direct purchaser cases, of whether or not a class
certification mechanism is even the efficient
mechanism for resolving a dispute at all.
I admit being biased somewhat because I
represent defendants in these cases, but you cross a
point where the class is so small and the
individualized issues are so great that, to the point
of the questioner, it is just not efficient.
Then you have other case where the number of
class members is higher and the amount of
individualized variation is smaller and the class
mechanism can be perhaps a more efficient way of
resolving the dispute.
But I think it is a much closer question
when you are dealing with a direct purchaser case with
a small set of plaintiffs, each of whom has a pretty
large volume of commerce and could bring a claim on
their own.

So at what point does it cross the hurdle

of being an efficient case management tool to proceed
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as a class?

I think that is one thing the courts are

grappling with in those cases.
DR. KORENKO:

I was going to say from an

economist’s perspective that is where the discovery is
really important.

Relying on defendant’s data,

digging in where they sell to whom for what price —
and, as Tram mentioned, there are negotiations — and
you see there is a lot of variation in the prices and
they are different across different purchasers and
they are different across different purchasers over
time.

These are things that you have to dig into both

as a plaintiff’s expert and as a defense expert to
figure out what is the appropriate way to capture what
is really going on in this marketplace.
I don’t have any more questions.
I have one question actually that occurred
to me while we were talking.

It’s funny that Jeff

talked about looking at other cases that come in and
we have to talk about averages and how they work in
the pharmaceutical space, looking outside of pharma.
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To what extent do you think the pharma cases that we
are looking at will bleed into other areas, other
industries and issues that we deal with in other
cases, or is the supply chain so unique in
pharmaceuticals that it does not really translate?
MR. BANK:

I think that the courts in cases

that are focused on other industries will have to look
at the pharmaceutical antitrust cases because these
issues are coming up so often in the pharmaceutical
antitrust context that the courts are really digging
in and trying to understand what it means to conduct a
rigorous analysis and look at certain merits issues
that overlap with class certification issues.
The Tyson Foods case was not an antitrust
case, but it certainly has impacted the antitrust
world, and I think the vice-versa is true.
Now, there are certain other industries with
more simplified distribution chains where some of the
specific nuanced arguments about pharma will not be
relevant, but overall the concepts may be
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transportable to those cases as well.
MS. FOLEY:

I agree.

Without a doubt, given

the number of the pharmaceutical cases that have
percolated through the appellate courts, they are
setting the standard for what you have to do.
Whether it is the basic question of
numerosity from the Modafinil case that we were
talking about — you know, how many class members do
you need to have a class — to the questions of using
averages and individualized inquiries about impactives
— the issues will spread and impact the entire range
of antitrust class actions.
DR. KORENKO:

Those are all the questions

that we have.
I want to thank our panelists.

This has

been a fantastic discussion that brought up a lot of
interesting issues.

I hope it has been informative to

all of the participants and that you have learned a
little bit about where we do stand in the world of
pharmaceutical class certification and that there is a
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little less confusion about where we are going to head
with that.
I also want to thank the folks at Fordham,
specifically James and Karen for organizing this.

I

want to thank Bill for the technical things working as
well as they did.

I understand there are a few kinks

to work out, but by and large this was pretty smooth.
I want to thank everybody again.
good day.

Have a

Everybody stay safe and healthy and enjoy

the rest of the conference.

